Eskom grid collapse warning 'misinterpreted'

Eskom CEO Tshediso Matona's warning about the possibility of a catastrophic total collapse of the grid was simply "the wrong use of grammar", says the power utility now.

At a meeting with CEOs and business leaders earlier this month, Matona was quoted as saying that "one unexpected event at any of Eskom's power stations could push the country to the total failure of the national electricity system" that may take weeks to resolve.

This sparked widespread fear that the country would be plunged into darkness - and that it would then take weeks to restart the grid, wiping out economic growth and sending investors scurrying.

But Eskom spokesman Andrew Etzinger said this week that Matona had been "misinterpreted" because of the incorrect use of grammar.

"It wasn't what the CEO meant," Etzinger said.

It wasn't an isolated statement, however.

Last week, after a media briefing at Megawatt Park, Robbie van Heerden, the general manager of Eskom's national control centre and one of its most senior engineers, acknowledged: "Total loss of control of the grid is a possibility."

The man described by Etzinger as "the most important [person] in the country" then checked himself, almost: "It won't happen... although that's what Italy said in 2003."

In that country, the results were catastrophic. Within 20 minutes of a tree falling on a cable bringing power from Switzerland, 57 million people were plunged into darkness. But only three people died and there was very little looting.

However, for two days in 2012, India suffered the biggest blackout in history, which affected almost 700million people.

It was chaos: transport ground to a halt, miners were stuck underground without airconditioning, riots broke out, more than 1000 fires were reported, 1600 stores were looted and almost 4000 people were arrested. Crematoria stopped working, leaving bodies half burned. It took just 24 hours to get India's grid up again. Italy's was up in 12.

It would be very different in South Africa. Unlike India and Italy, we have no neighbours with enough power to kick-start our system back into operation, according to Van Heerden. And "people will most likely steal the cables", which would scupper any hope of a hasty restart.

Without power for an extended period, water, sewerage and other infrastructure would stop working. Fuel pipeline deliveries would cease, causing all forms of travel to grind to a halt. Without rapid action by the army and police, pundits say anarchy would quickly ensue.

Realistic prospects of a national blackout?

In a meeting with Business Times at Megawatt Park this week, Etzinger, Van Heerden and another senior engineer, Robert Kock, said there were such sophisticated safety nets in place that a blackout was all but impossible.

"[A blackout] doesn't even appear on our list as something we'd ever go into," Van Heerden said.

However, a system operator transmission document, titled "Ancillary Services Technical Requirements", shows that such an event is on the list of possibilities considered by Eskom. The document explains what equipment needs to be in place, how it needs to be maintained and what it must be able to do should such an event occur.

The document states that in the event of a system collapse, a relay of generators must be able to gradually build up the power supply and kick-start base-load generators. It is not an easy process, and is clearly not foolproof: each of the critical initial start-up generators needs to be able to manage at least three attempts to deliver 30 to 50MW.

Despite this, Van Heerden, Kock and Etzinger were adamant that the scenario was impossible. "Everything we do, the way we manage the system, is all so that we will never have a blackout."

Van Heerden said: "There would have to be earthquakes and tidal waves. There is as much chance of that happening as there is of this building falling down."

The Eskom national control centre in Ekurhuleni is the interface between the power grid limping along or suffering a blackout. Teams of engineers monitor the functioning of each part of the grid for 24 hours each day.

Van Heerden, or his counterpart, has the absolute authority to shut down as much of the grid as is needed. "We wouldn't try to be nice," Etzinger said.

Simphiwe Nkwali. 

Last year a silo collapsed at Majuba power station in Mpumalanga, scything off around 3000MW from the grid (which is about 40000MW strong at any given time) and sending the country into a frenzy of load shedding. In 2013 a turbine at Duvha power station, in the same province, exploded - taking 600MW off the grid; last year boiler over-pressurisation at Duvha took 600MW offline. What if all this happened in a matter of minutes?

Kock said an automatic emergency trip wire was in place in case a controller could not flip the switches fast enough. Called "under frequency load shedding", this system should take sufficient load off the grid almost instantly.

The grid is divided into five "islands", so a loss of control in one region can be isolated to protect the other parts. The parts that were still powered up would be able to restart the rest. Each region has its own moni-toring hub, but their whereabouts are top secret to maintain security .

But still, Eskom is nervous, and is apparently taking no chances. Shaun Nel, the spokesman for the Energy Intensive Users Group, which accounts for 44% of the country's electricity usage, said this week that his group and Eskom had run through the [blackout] scenario repeatedly in the past year. "They haven't got their heads in the sand," he said.

The one thing missing from Eskom's reported repertoire of disaster management is apparently grammar lessons for its CEO.