Below is the annual lecture delivered by former president Thabo Mbeki at the Association of Foreign Relations Professionals of Nigeria, an extract of which was published in the Sunday Times.
First of all, I thank the association for giving me the honour to deliver this 2023 annual lecture and sincerely apologise that I cannot be with you in person today. Regrettably, during the last few days it has proved impossible for me to travel out of the country as I had to attend to family matters which demanded my presence.
I also thank Chief Emeka Anyaoku for his very kind remarks about me.
I was very pleased to learn he would chair this annual lecture. This is because he has been my leader for many years. He was also an outstanding fighter against apartheid. For this reason, our government gave him the highest award we bestow on non-South Africans who have played an outstanding role in liberating South Africa and helping to build the new democracy.
He is therefore an esteemed member of the Order of the Companions of OR Tambo, and is truly a Companion of Oliver Tambo.
As you understood from the comments Chief Anyaoku made, Nigeria is my second home. Because of this, it was hurtful I was not able to return to Nigeria for this important event today.
Mr Chairman, with your permission before I get into the substance of my remarks, I would like to explain these will be in two parts.
As you know, the association asked me to address the challenging topic Examining the nexus between foreign policy goals and democratic governance.
Having spent some time reflecting on how I should honour the request of the association, I decided my remarks should be in two parts. The first part will tend towards the more theoretical, scholarly and general. The second part will be more practical and focused on Africa.
The aphorism “all politics is local” is appropriate and relevant in a discussion about the vexed question about the nexus between democratic governance and foreign policy goals. This is a most important question and one that receives scant attention.
Yet it has a fundamental bearing on such matters as human development and advancement, power relations and democratic practice, peace and security, and it carries domestic and international dimensions.
Let us first get a handle on both the ideas of democratic governance and that of foreign policy goals.
Governments pursue domestic policy objectives on behalf of the nation. The actuality of democratic governance is very important because in principle it dictates the elaboration of policies that actually serve the interests of the people.
However, it is given that none of our countries are islands in themselves, but exist within the context of the community of nations. It therefore follows that our governments must also pursue foreign policy goals to serve the national interest, with the fact of democratic governance being important because it lends the necessary legitimacy to these goals and gives the necessary strength to the demand to democratise the system of international relations.
Democratic governance, unlike the over-used concept of good governance coined by the Word Bank soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the “first Cold War”, is not a technical and technicist concept. It is true good governance contains very important elements worthy of pursuing, such as combating corruption, ensuring efficient administration, holding free and fair elections and prudent management of the fiscus.
But it also contains some problematic dimensions such as a limited involvement of the state in development, reducing the role of the state to creating a conducive environment for market forces, austerity policies and trickle-down economics, which are prescripts generally contained within what are called the Washington Consensus and neo-liberalism.
Democratic governance essentially refers to the relations between the state and society, and therefore the empowerment of citizens to participate in and help shape political and policy outcomes
— Former president Thabo Mbeki
It is the concept of democratic governance that is important here. Democratic governance essentially refers to the relations between the state and society, and therefore the empowerment of citizens to participate in and help shape political and policy outcomes. Governments essentially derive their legitimacy from being anchored in society, in engaging all the societal actors, and taking public opinion seriously.
In this context, it is not difficult to understand the nexus between domestic policy goals and democratic governance, as these goals, obviously, must serve the people from whom it draws its legitimacy.
Domestically, the power dynamics between state and societal actors are important. Externally, and in similar fashion, there is also the question of power, politics and the actions of other states, and how power is exercised bilaterally and of importance in multilateral institutions.
The fundamental point we are raising here is that, nationally and in terms of foreign policy, democratic governance invokes the powerful ideas of partnerships and social compacts or social contracts. Nationally it is about a social contract between the state and society, and social compacts between the government and key social actors like the private sector, organised labour and civil society.
In foreign policy terms it is about mutually beneficial partnerships between Africa and powerful external actors, as well as between individual states and external counterparts. A major challenge we face as Africans is how we get 55 different states to act as one, and to speak with one voice.
This goes to the heart of African agency, of how African states organise themselves strongly so as to serve not narrow self-interests, but continental interests. It is imperative that as Africans we craft a continental or global African interest perspective.
Let us say something about the notion of foreign policy goals. all States have such goals, and as a continent Africa has clear goals which are articulated through the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities. Of course, there is also the African diaspora which is the sixth AU region. In this context, in recent years scholars and scholar-activists like Horace Campbell and Hillary Beckless have made the case that we should now talk about global Africa.
Foreign policy activities aim to make a change, solve a problem, promote change and influence change in the actions of another state. Essentially governments define what the state seeks in the world, to serve its national interests, and then determine the means to attain this goal, and this culminates in a policy.
This describes what happens universally.
Although foreign policy objectives may vary from state to state, they tend to involve such goals as self-preservation, security, national wellbeing or welfare and development, national prestige, the protection and advancement of ideology and the pursuit of power.
As mentioned, there are different goals of foreign policy, essentially derived from general government practice internationally. While such commonalities have changed over time, there are at least four purposes that are common to all contemporary sates to this day, namely:
- security,
- autonomy or sovereignty,
- welfare
- status and prestige.
Not all states have the same priority on those purposes at any given time. Those who make foreign policy may wish in an ideal world to prioritise all of them, but in the real world, prioritising one has to be at the cost of another.
In the era of globalisation, two other foreign policy goals that are pursued are protection of ethnic, ideological or religious colleagues and cultural preservation and world reorganisation.
In its communication to me, the association has said: There is the question whether African countries are really using Africa's vibrant diplomatic dialogue to preserve and strengthen democracy for peace, progress and development in the Continent, and; what is the nexus between the continent’s foreign policy goals and democracy and how can this advance peace, growth and development in Africa.
It is true the AU has taken a very strong position on the matter of democracy on our continent, as reflected for instance in the Constitutive Act of the Union, the Charter on Human and People's Rights and the Charter of Democracy, Elections and Governance.
There is no doubt peace, growth and development on our continent would benefit greatly if the democratic governance visualised in these policy documents was well-entrenched throughout Africa.
The fact, however, is that particularly the AU, but also the majority of the Regional Economic Communities, are not doing enough to ensure the democratic vision contained in the AU documents is fully realised.
Here I will only mention the AU, starting with the AU Commission.
The Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance gives great scope to the commission to engage all the member states on the objectives in the charter. The commission would then report to the executive council to reinforce the activities of the commission. And so would this matter, of the democratisation of our continent, end up as an important part of the agenda of the assembly.
None of this is happening, with the commission largely respecting the charter on democracy only by observing elections.
Further than this, as the union was being reorganised to improve its efficiency and efficacy, a serious error was made.
I speak here of the dissolution of the Commission on Political Affairs as a stand alone body, and its re-emergence as the Commission on Political Affairs, Peace and Security.
It was exactly the Commission on Political Affairs which should have focused on the matter of the democratisation of the continent. It is very obvious that integrated with peace and security, the task to take care of political affairs will fade into the background.
More striking with regard to the foregoing is that it was precisely the Commission on Political Affairs that had the responsibility to take the lead in encouraging the continent to pursue its strategic goals of unity and renaissance.
No other commission had or has this responsibility. This had created a dangerous and absurd situation which must be corrected and which would thus give the AU commission the institution actively to pursue the democratisation of the continent, joining the vibrant diplomatic dialogue which the association has spoken of.
However, it also stands to reason that the vitally important goals of peace, progress and development will not be achieved solely on the basis of the spread of democratic governance on our continent.
Let us start with that matter of peace and security.
Here we are not talking about the item security, as it appears as a standard matter in most state foreign policy goals globally.
Rather, we are speaking of ending conflict and therefore achieving peace and security within African states where conflict had broken out precisely because of the absence of systems of democratic governance.
In 2016 the esteemed Algerian diplomat and leader Lakhdar Brahimi and myself contributed a preface to a report entitled African Politics, African Peace in which we said: “Quite correctly in our view, the report highlights what it designates as 'the primacy of the political' with regard to the task to achieve permanent peace, security and stability on our continent.
“The African definition of 'the politics of peace' underlines and emphasises the point that, to address effectively the challenge of conflict on our continent requires that we do not limit ourselves to putting in place security arrangements on the basis of a wrong assumption that peace consists merely in the absence of war.
“The process of ending a conflict must be understood in its wide political context, and not just on the basis of the narrow security consideration that the guns have fallen silent.”
I am afraid this is not yet happening in the context of the important work the AU is doing to end the conflicts on our continent.
We are not doing enough to implement the preventive policies of the AU and have fallen short in other instances, such as the now ended very violent conflict between the governments of Ethiopia and the regional government of Tigray.
The re-emergence of the phenomenon of military coups or military interventions on our continent has emphasised the importance of the implementation of the preventive policies of the AU, as well as interventions to help ensure the popular legitimacy of the democratic systems we establish in our countries.
I have tried to highlight what has been called “the primacy of the political” in the solution of the conflicts on our continent. This means the process of conflict resolution must include getting to the roots of every conflict with a view to ensuring such conflict does not recur.
As you would expect, almost invariably this would bring us back to the matter your association has raised, the matter of democratic governance. In the absence of such governance, citizens take to arms to resolve their differences.
It is the obligation of the institutions of the AU, such as the Peace and Security Council, that in their important work they ensure the primacy of the political and thus help to move more of our countries to the democratic order which is high among the objectives of the AU.
Quite correctly, your association has drawn attention to the importance of the objective of growth and development on our continent. Of course all of us know the mere presence of democratic governance will not assure such growth and development.
It is important that even as we engage this matter of development we do so in a way which ensures the involvement of democratic institutions, such as our elected legislatures, in the development processes.
I do not recall that at any time the continent undertook a serious review of an economic programme it was moving away from, explaining why it had to adopt the next programme
— Former president Thabo Mbeki
Let me talk briefly about the economic programmes our continent has put in place to address its development challenges. I refer here to the programme agreed at the 1963 founding of
- the OAU;
- the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action;
- the 1991 African Economic Community;
- the 2021 New Partnership for Economic Development; and,
- Agenda 2063 of 2013 and 2015.
The are five economic development programmes during the first 50 years of the OAU and the AU.
Given the critical importance to Africa of the development objective, it is important an assessment should be made of what these programmes contributed to Africa's development.
I do not recall that at any time the continent undertook a serious review of an economic programme it was moving away from, explaining why it had to adopt the next programme.
Cognisant of the nexus between foreign policy goals, such as development, it would give greater impetus to the implementation of important policies if the programme reviews I have mentioned also included such democratic institutions as the elected legislatures.
As an example of the failure to carry out the programme reviews, I know very well there was no serious review of the economic programme contained in the 1991 African Economic Community document before the OAU adopted the Nepad document in 2001.
This raises serious questions about the relationship between policy formation and policy implementation.
As individual member states of the AU, like the Federal Republic of Nigeria, we might have advanced this as one of our foreign policy goals to persuade the majority of the AU member states to adopt a comprehensive continental economic pogramme, and then succeeded in this regard.
The contrary point I am making here is that for half-a-century since the founding of the OAU, our continent has not done a good job of implementing the successive economic programmes it adopted.
Accordingly, the question arises what should be done to ensure the implementation of the foreign policy goals which were adopted as AU policies, not accepting such fate as has met the successive economic programmes.
Of course, all this relates to the important matter of development, which the association has correctly mentioned.
Once more, this raises the question of the institutional capacity of our continental organisations, the OAU and the AU, successfully to ensure the implementation of decisions adopted by the relevant assemblies of these organisations.
My considered view in this regard is that the heads of state and government themselves should pay close attention to the implementation of the most important decisions of the AU.
It is perfectly obvious the more we democratise our continent the greater will be our possibility successfully to address such challenges as continental integration, development, peace, and others
— Former president Thabo Mbeki
It is perfectly obvious the more we democratise our continent the greater will be our possibility successfully to address such challenges as continental integration, development, peace, and others.
Similarly, however, the matter of the institutional capacities of the AU and the RECs to implement agreed policies is of vital importance.
Indeed, it might be appropriate to make another effort to examine the functioning of the AU in the context of its major objectives, to ensure it has the capacity to promote these objectives.
In this regard, I also believe it is vitally important to ensure the right choices of the personnel given the responsibility to lead the AU, such as the commission as a whole.
We must also return to the important matter of the spread of democratic governance on our continent.
In 2022, International IDEA released a Report around the issue of democratic governance, entitled The Global State of Democracy 2022, Forging Social Contracts in a Time of Discontent.
This report argues that in terms of democratic governance, “social contracts vary depending on the cultural and historical context, but all democracies share certain core commonalities, including respect for individual civil and political rights, fair and competitive elections, a reasonably equal exercise of power by the governed over their government, and effective access to a set of entitlements that make a dignified and meaningful life possible”.
About Africa the report says that “decades of state capture by illiberal 'strong men' have resulted in serious democratic decline. Some leaders are resorting to desperate efforts to change constitutions and legal frameworks to help them maintain power”.
“Despite a myriad of challenges, Africa remains resilient in the face of instability. Countries including the Gambia, Niger (until yesterday's coup), and Zambia continue to improve in democratic quality. Overcoming a restricted civic space, civic action in several countries has created opportunities to renegotiate the social contract. Coups d'etat and unconstitutional transfers of power have transformed Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali into new frontiers of instability, but they are only the most striking examples in a general picture of declining regime performance across a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa.”
We may very well question some of the conclusions of International IDEA about the state of democracy on our continent.
However, I believe we must ourselves make an honest assessment of this state of democracy, bearing in mind the point we ourselves have made that there is a nexus between the continental goals we have set ourselves and democratic governance.
All this therefore suggests that as Africans we share the imperative to join hands to encourage democratic governance throughout our continent, consistent with the existing AU policies on this matter, such as the Constitutive Act which states that one of the objectives of the AU is to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance.
Thank you for your attention.
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