OpinionPREMIUM

DAVID MONYAE | US national security strategy redraws Africa policy lines

Washington’s trade-first, resource-driven approach risks fracturing African unity and weakening collective bargaining power

U.S. President Trump hosts Rwanda and DR Congo foreign ministers at the White House (Ken Cedeno)

US President Donald Trump’s administration unveiled a National Security Strategy (NSS) that carves out a dedicated section on Africa, signalling a seismic shift in US-Africa policy.

The strategy pivots to targeted economic partnerships, emphasising trade, investment and access to Africa’s vast resources.

Washington now favours “reliable” states — those willing to unconditionally open their markets to American goods and services and align geopolitically — over aid-dependent nations or those pursuing ideological agendas.

This pragmatic, profit-driven approach prioritises resource-rich partners, positioning the US to secure critical minerals and energy supplies.

While it presents a mixed bag for individual African countries, it undermines the continent’s collective development agenda and fractures African unity.

Consider South Africa, the continent’s economic powerhouse and a vocal champion of the Global South. Its deepening ties with China and Brics, coupled with its International Court of Justice case against Israel, have branded it “unreliable” and hostile in Washington’s eyes. The NSS implies reduced US investment and diplomatic warmth for Pretoria, demonstrating how geopolitical misalignment could sideline even major players.

This selective lens extends to security co-operation. The strategy urges negotiated settlements in flashpoints such as the Rwanda–Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) conflict and Sudan, while preventing new ones in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. It warns of resurgent Islamist terrorism but rejects long-term American military commitment, pushing instead for African-led solutions backed by US economic incentives.

The DRC–Rwanda peace deal, dubbed the Washington Accord exemplifies this model. Building on a 2024 framework, it mandates Rwanda to withdraw troops from eastern DRC within 90 days and halt DRC support for the FDLR militia, while establishing joint security mechanisms to disarm groups such as M23.

Tied to economic integration, the accord woos US investors into DRC cobalt and coltan reserves, granting Rwanda market access while stabilising supply chains. However, the largely economic focus of America’s engagement carries risks, as fighting has persisted despite the agreement. Success could blueprint US economic diplomacy across Africa; failure may entrench proxy wars and instability.

According to the NSS, resource-rich states such as the DRC stand to benefit from increased US investment in minerals, energy infrastructure, nuclear power and advanced technologies. Aid-dependent countries, however, face adjustment pains under this trade-first paradigm. While some analysts hail the pivot as an influence booster, it extracts a steep price that may limit its durability.

Take Nigeria, grappling with Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province jihadists. The NSS deems these threats worthy of vigilance, offering intelligence sharing, training and equipment sales — but no grants or enduring commitments. Support hinges on Abuja’s geopolitical posture and reforms, pressuring it to prioritise US interests without intervention that could decisively alter the terror balance.

Take Nigeria, grappling with Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province jihadists. The NSS deems these threats worthy of vigilance, offering intelligence sharing, training and equipment sales — but no grants or enduring commitments. Support hinges on Abuja’s geopolitical posture and reforms, pressuring it to prioritise US interests without intervention that could decisively alter the terror balance.

This blueprint places Africa in a diplomatic vice, compelling alignment with US economic and strategic priorities while constraining partnerships with China, Russia or the UAE. The continent should reject forced choices between superpowers and pursue pragmatic self-interest without coercion. “Reliability” should rest on shared values — human rights, fair trade, equality and mutual respect — rather than one-sided dictates.

Africa’s treatment during South Africa’s 2025 G20 presidency underscores the peril. US absence from key events appeared punitive amid accusations of Brics flirtation and “politics of grievance”. The standoff triggered tariffs, aid cuts and diplomatic strain, eroding trade and climate co-operation.

This episode mirrors the NSS’s bifurcated Africa policy, where compliant states secure mineral deals and security support while defiant ones face isolation, tariffs and visa scrutiny. Africa’s major powers — South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt — should brace for strained ties if Global South activism outweighs US alignment. The transactional ethos favours American supply chains over multilateral solidarity, accelerating multipolar drift.

For African unity and collective bargaining, the NSS signals fragmentation. Its divide-and-rule incentives reward market access and rival-bashing with investment, diluting unified positions on trade, security, debt relief and climate finance. The US retreat from broad aid and AU peacekeeping, paired with punitive economic tools, dictates compliance and discourages solidarity.

Yet opportunity lies in response. Africa can strengthen unity through the African Continental Free Trade Area and deeper South-South co-operation. The continent should resist country-specific deals that weaken collective leverage and instead pursue AU-led bargaining on security, trade and investment.

Diplomatically, African states should engage Washington transactionally, trading market access for genuine technology transfer and security co-operation, while deepening Brics ties. Universal values must anchor Africa’s definition of reliability. The lesson from South Africa’s experience is clear: Africa’s agency depends on unity, not capitulation.

• David Monyae is director of the Centre for Africa–China Studies at the University of Johannesburg


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