IVOR CHIPKIN | Public service reform could herald South Africa’s ‘third transition’

South Africa is on the cusp of a third transition, rationalising and professionalising its public administration.

The Public Service Administration Bill (PSAB), which will divest politicians of control of administrative tasks in government departments, especially the power to recruit civil servants and make operational decisions, was passed by the National Council of Provinces on November 4 last year. All it needs now to become law is the assent of the president.

When the ANC came to power in 1994, it inherited various public administrations that it did not trust to implement its policies. In addition, the country had been carved up into a maze of self-governing territories and nominally independent states. Bophuthatswana, for example, had a public service of 65,000 people in 26 departments. Then deputy president Thabo Mbeki was concerned that the civil service was not only resistant to instruction from ANC ministers but was a potential source of insurrection.

In this context, the ANC sought direct party-political control of the civil service. It did this by granting political executives (the president, cabinet ministers and provincial council members) powers over two key functions: recruitment and HR management, and operational decisions. These powers were set out in the Public Service Act of 1994.

Executive authorities were given the discretion to sign these powers over to senior departmental officials. They also had the discretion not to do so or to withdraw such powers.

Ministers interfered in the running of departments, blocked officials from doing their jobs or appointed pliant officials.

The consequences of this muddling of political and administrative powers quickly became manifest. Senior officials could not do their jobs unless their ministers let them. Ministers interfered in the running of departments, blocked officials from doing their jobs or appointed pliant officials.

The results were predictable. Directors-general and heads of departments resigned, creating instability in departments. Between 1998 and 2002 the Public Services Commission found that 62% of managers had changed jobs within the public service, though this later stabilised at a still high 32%. In 1998, a review by the Presidency found that departments were struggling to implement government policy and attributed this in part to the poor delineation between political and administrative roles. Warnings went unheeded, and the situation deteriorated.

The failure to properly distinguish between political and administrative offices caused three related problems:

• civil servants appointed on loyalty rather than merit;
• departments without skilled and experienced officials; and
• high turnover and vacancies in vital positions.

Taken together, these problems mean government departments are unable to function effectively; this is why the unglamorously named PSAB is so important.

The bill proposes removing the executive authorities’ powers over human resource management in departments and their discretion over operational decisions. Politicians will no longer be allowed to appoint senior officials (apart from directors-general), nor will they have the power to issue instructions about day-to-day operations. Instead these powers will be vested in senior officials themselves.

The amendments specify that the role of the political executive will be to make policy and hold the administration accountable for delivering on it. The amendment thus goes far in enshrining the creation of a relatively autonomous public administration in law.

Many officials are political appointees; many are reaching retirement age and are focused on preserving their pensions — so not getting fired or demoted.

This is not a silver bullet, however. It does not resolve how officials should be appointed. Moreover, many are critical of a law that is seen to consolidate the hold of ANC apparatchiks in government at the very moment the ANC is in chronic electoral decline. There is a danger that in the current era of political flux and coalition government, opposition parties will be tempted to repoliticise the civil service rather than go through with rationalisation.

Nevertheless, if the bill becomes law, it will have immediate effects in departments, recalibrating power relations between politicians and officials.

Senior public servants will have the power to do their work, although it does not necessarily mean they will start doing it well.

Many officials are political appointees, many are reaching retirement age and are focused on preserving their pensions — so not getting fired or demoted.

What it will do, however, is change the incentive structure in government. As performance in government increasingly becomes an electoral issue, politicians are under pressure to be seen to provide services.

Without the power to intervene directly in public administrations, the political class as a collective will be incentivised to expedite further reforms to improve the merit and virtue of civil servants.

In other words, the legislation could incentivise systemic, rather than ad hoc, changes across the government system. If this happens, South Africa’s bureaucratic transition, what I call “the third transition”, will be under way.

• Ivor Chipkin is director of the New South Institute. He also teaches public policy at the Gordon Institute of Business Science.