MCEBISI JONAS | South Africa’s ‘middle power moment’

Dramatic developments in diplomatic and trade relations, as well as military actions, mean the sands shift under us faster than our ability to perceive the state of the world, let alone navigate the path ahead.

We are living through an era in which history is being remade daily, not just as the tragedy and farce that Karl Marx referred to an age ago but to the extent that the reshaping of the world now creates somewhat of an existential crisis.

The upset of the international rules-based order and multilateral system has introduced tough questions about geopolitical identity and alliances, as coercive tools such as tariffs, sanctions, financial restrictions, weaponised supply chains, military incursions and undermining of the sovereignty of nations have shattered the orderly rules of engagement.

So how do the progressives and democratic pragmatists reassemble, reorganise and reimagine? The idea of a “middle power moment” asks what we can do to respond to the crisis and what we should do to shape the global order and advance our national and collective interests.

The “middle powers” label should not be used as a slogan — a means to assert our own importance or enjoy the flattery that comes by association with the efforts of others. We should ask what kind of agency do middle powers actually have in a world where the old order is giving way to something new and undefined?

Unlike superpowers, middle powers cannot set the rules of the international system. They cannot impose global stability by the deployment of force. They remain painfully exposed to the consequences of war, financial crises, disruptions to trade routes, technological fragmentation and climate shocks.

But middle powers, by definition, must have the capacity to deploy some kind of “power” or leverage. They can build consent to global rules and influence the trajectory of change. They can construct new alliances and convene, mediate and build coalitions.

They can build new systems of global law or new monetary and economic institutions. Acting together, they might broker an end to global conflicts or reach agreements that help stabilise financial markets, bring order to economic relations, and protect their commerce where it counts most. Moreover, by strengthening relations between each other, they can foster greater resilience for themselves and the world.

Canada has recognised this with some clarity. Prime Minister Mark Carney has spoken of the need for middle powers to be both principled and pragmatic. He has argued that the countries in-between have a choice: either compete with each other for favour or combine to create a third path with impact. Much of what Carney spoke about in Davos is playing out in real time this week in the escalating trade war between two very old friends and allies.

We cannot build a middle-power economy on our own market alone

South Africa should take this seriously, considering the fragility of our own diplomatic and trade relationships. Middle powers must build strength at home. A country that wants room for independent action must reduce its vulnerabilities. Strategic autonomy has material, economic, social and security foundations.

The idea of “middle powers” became salient for countries like Canada and Australia in the wake of the Cold War. These older middle powers were generally wealthy, stable, and core elements of the Western alliance centred on the US.

South Africa is among the new, “emerging” middle powers, together with India, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Türkiye and Vietnam. Many have long been on the “semi-periphery” of global affairs, forced to navigate between capricious superpowers ready to meddle in their domestic affairs. Many are scarred by deep social cleavages and are caught in economic stagnation known as the “middle-income trap”.

South Africa itself has been a quintessential middle power for some time. As Britain reordered its empire after World War 1, Jan Smuts worked to secure a global deal that would advance the interests of “white South Africa”.

Smuts saw this commonwealth as an “organic melding” of the white nations of the British Empire — South Africa, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the British “motherland” — and drawing in the US, to create a new empire modelled on ancient Rome.

This arrangement, Smuts believed, would advance white culture while providing collective security against the threat of restless natives in Africa and Asia, who seemed poised to combine with the revolutionary thrust of the newborn Soviet Union.

One hundred years later, South Africa approaches the new “middle power moment” not as a white nation seeking the protection of the British Empire or any other great power. We face the challenge of linking our international stance to nation-building and growth. The values on which this rests are universal and democratic. They recognise a common humanity and demand social justice in the ordering of global society. Sadly, some within our country still seek to define our foreign relations and alliances on racial terms or subservience to the superpowers as they were 100 years ago.

Like other middle powers in the Global South, South Africa’s interest is not only to stabilise the global order, but to transform it profoundly in a manner that makes our national development possible. This ambition raises new questions: how does a country with limited material weight, deep domestic constraints and significant regional responsibilities build agency in a fragmenting world? What is the possibility of leveraging international relations to turn around the deep social crisis at home? What are the regional, continental and global dimensions of this strategy?

We cannot keep screaming into our pillows as political bullying, populism and ethno-nationalist politics continue to rise and dominate the public square

South Africa’s influence has often rested on the moral capital of the democratic transition, on our constitutional order, on our financial and institutional capabilities, and on our ability to connect our national position to a wider African and Global South agenda. But that form of influence is fragile. It depends on credibility and trust. It depends on what others believe is South Africa’s agenda in light of our official policy of non-alignment. Our case before the International Court of Justice on the Palestinian genocide is an example of where our agenda is questioned.

These points are also salient when considering South Africa’s role on the African continent and in our region of Southern Africa.

For the last few decades, South Africa was elevated in the G7, the G20 and other global forums as the voice of Africa. Western interlocutors often promoted this role, but other putative middle powers on the African continent have contested it. This contestation is inevitable, as others recognise the limits of South African diplomacy when it is presented as “altruism” but in tension with South African interests.

A recent example is South Africa’s attempt to convene a debtors’ club on behalf of African debtors, while also building its role as a creditor nation in the IMF and the Paris Club. South Africa’s real diplomatic heft does not come from speaking on others’ behalf but from speaking together with others.

But we must also recognise the limits of our own position. South Africa is important in Africa, but it is not Africa. We have capabilities and constitutional legitimacy, but also domestic failures that weaken our authority.

A middle-power strategy requires a capable state, economic growth, the repair of infrastructure, and energy security. It requires the ability to negotiate trade agreements, implement them and support firms to use them. Importantly, there should be co-ordination with business, labour and civil society without the state being captured by any of them.

The task is not to choose one partner to replace another. It is to build relationships that increase our room to manoeuvre and strengthen our developmental capabilities.

So we must ask: does our foreign and trade policy adequately reflect and adapt to the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world that is unlikely to revert to the old situation of hard-wired bipolarity? This is fundamental to how we survive the storm.

Here again, Canada is an important interlocutor.

As we have said, Canada and South Africa are not the same kind of middle power. Canada brings governance capabilities, investment institutions, energy and critical minerals capacity, security relationships and a tradition of middle-power diplomacy. South Africa brings an African location, experience in Global South coalition-building and a direct stake in reforming institutions that often fail developing countries.

As we navigate the new terrain, we must recognise that no single grand coalition will solve everything that has been disrupted

The opportunity is not to pretend that our interests are identical. It is to ask where they overlap: human rights, development finance, climate resilience, critical minerals, food and energy security, democratic institutions, peace and security, digital infrastructure, taxation and reform of multilateral institutions.

A middle power compact could build a global alliance — one in which nations that understand the value of collective solidarity engage not only for their own economic and security benefit, but help to restore an overarching structure to which all of humanity belongs.

We cannot build a middle-power economy on our own market alone. Our influence depends on whether Southern Africa and Africa become part of a wider platform for trade, production, investment and development.

Regional integration is now more necessary.

The combination of critical minerals and growing consumption demand gives the continent real leverage, provided that African countries can aggregate rather than be courted individually through exploitative deals. South Africa is best placed to broker this aggregation.

As we navigate the new terrain, we must recognise that no single grand coalition will solve everything that has been disrupted. For South Africa, the agenda should be clear.

We need faster growth, higher investment, more employment, greater resilience, a capable state, stronger institutions and a more effective contribution to Africa’s development. We should defend international law consistently, because weaker and middle-sized states need rules more than great powers do.

We should work with African partners and use Brics, the G20 and other forums to advance practical outcomes in finance, trade, climate, security, energy, technology and development. We should rebuild our domestic capabilities so that our foreign policy rests on substance rather than memory.

The world is changing rapidly, whether we are prepared or not. If middle powers do not act together, the choices available to us will be narrowed by others. If we do not shape the rules, we will live under rules made elsewhere. If we do not align foreign policy with development, our diplomacy will become theatre.

South Africa’s task is not to choose a patron for a new era. Non-alignment also does not free us from hard choices. It should not mean moral indifference or inconsistency about international law. It should not mean nostalgia for ideological battles that are no longer relevant.

In essence, the middle power moment requires that countries like ours convert our position in the world into agency. At home we must build the capabilities that make influence abroad possible.

We cannot keep screaming into our pillows as political bullying, populism and ethno-nationalist politics continue to rise and dominate the public square. Intellectual discourse is important for the health of our nations and the future of our planet.

• Jonas is chair of MTN and a former deputy minister of finance. He spoke at the launch of the Nucleus Institute, of which he is the founder