Government caught napping during July unrest despite warnings, expert panel finds

According to the report, it appeared that everyone in the country knew that something was brewing after Jacob Zuma’s arrest but intelligence services, who ought to have known and should have done something about it, did not

07 February 2022 - 15:47
subscribe Just R20 for the first month. Support independent journalism by subscribing to our digital news package.
Subscribe now
An expert panel appointed to investigate the deadly July 2021 riots has found that the police's response was inadequate. File photo.
An expert panel appointed to investigate the deadly July 2021 riots has found that the police's response was inadequate. File photo.
Image: Alaister Russell/Sunday Times

SA's security cluster was caught napping when deadly violence broke out in parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in July last year.

The “July unrest” — which saw unprecedented looting of shops and destruction of property — happened despite national intelligence having warned that such violence was very possible in 2021.

This information is contained in a report on what President Cyril Ramaphosa at the time described as a “failed insurrection”. Ramaphosa commissioned the report, which was released for public consumption on Monday.

“The National Intelligence Estimate had warned that conditions were ripe for unrest and possibly violence in 2021, yet key government ministries and departments had not planned accordingly,” reads the report.

The panel, chaired by Prof Sandy Africa, found that events linked to the jailing of former president Jacob Zuma were a significant contributor to the unrest, in which more than 300 people were ultimately killed and R50bn “wiped” from the country's economy.

“There had been several acts of major public disorder and violence in the lead-up to former president Jacob Zuma’s incarceration, with firearms being discharged publicly, among others.

“There were increasingly emboldened calls for disruptions on social media, including a call for a national shutdown. In spite of this, none of the intelligence structures of the state was able to predict or forewarn that the outbreak of looting, violence and destruction would take place in the form and the manner that it did,” the report reads.

It appeared that everyone in the country knew that something was brewing after Zuma’s arrest but intelligence services, who ought to have known and should have done something about it, did not.

“Several communities, in the days leading up to the violence, were aware that it would take place. Business delegations also informed us that they had been made aware that violence was imminent.

It struck us as inexplicable that the security services, and in particular the intelligence services, did not know the violence would happen and take the form that it did.
Report on the July unrest

“It struck us as inexplicable that the security services, and in particular the intelligence services, did not know the violence would happen and take the form that it did,” Africa's report reads.

Worse still, the report found, intelligence services had no excuse since they had unique rights to intrude into people’s lives for the right reasons, especially when the country’s stability was at stake.

Police, on the other hand, told the panel that they could not contain the unrest due to not having enough personnel. Furthermore, the public order police (POP) division was found to not have enough personnel or the necessary resources to carry out their work successfully.

The panel found that there was just one water cannon per province for the POP, and that KZN had to call for assistance from another province for the use of theirs.

Police leadership also argued to the panel that they suspected the mastermind of the July unrest had inside information about challenges faced by SAPS.

“The police ran out of supplies they needed, such as rubber bullets and teargas canisters. On the other hand, accounts from people who witnessed the violence suggest that the people who initiated the violence knew that they would be met with little resistance, if any,” the report reads.

The panel found that though the police knew there was a storm coming, they did not know what form and shape it would take.

However, it said this was not a good enough excuse because “looters continued to use the same modus operandi for the next seven days or so, without the police substantially changing their plans” to fit events that were unfolding.

“Relying on past experience, the police anticipated that the protests would manifest in one or more of the following ways: blockages of roads; attacks on foreign truck drivers; and marches to places such as the city hall or ANC headquarters.

“The police developed operational plans based on the information available to them and in accordance with past experience,” the report reads.

At the Mooi River Toll Plaza, where the unrest started with the burning of trucks, police who had been deployed in advance had left their posts. This was apparently because they had to attend to another incident in Pietermaritzburg. This created fertile ground for the arsonists to do their work — burning trucks — without disturbance by police. The police told the panel the two incidents were not linked to one another.

The report did, however, praise the SA National Defence Force (SANDF), saying that theirs was a “timely and effective” deployment to save the day — with almost immediate results.

The arrival and continued presence of the SANDF members went a long way to calm down the situation.

“The arrival of members of the SANDF, albeit a little late, assisted to stabilise the situation.

“There is no doubt that the police had insufficient capacity to stop the violence. The riots happened simultaneously in areas distant from each other. They took a form generally unfamiliar to the police, where large crowds descended on shopping malls and warehouses, to loot.

“The size of the crowds made it impossible for the police deployed to prevent the looting. Moreover, there were members from across social groups involved: young and old, mothers with babies, and the police were in a dilemma about the degree of force they should use.

“Though the police, and indeed some members of the public, felt that the SANDF members arrived on the scene a little late, the SANDF believes that theirs was the fastest turnaround time for a military operation. The arrival and continued presence of the SANDF members went a long way to calm down the situation,” the report reads.

The panel was not so kind on the country’s intelligence services, saying they “failed to predict the nature, scale and modus operandi of the July violence”.

TimesLIVE


subscribe Just R20 for the first month. Support independent journalism by subscribing to our digital news package.
Subscribe now

Would you like to comment on this article?
Sign up (it's quick and free) or sign in now.

Speech Bubbles

Please read our Comment Policy before commenting.