Unless the ANC becomes more responsive, honest and competent, it will end up like the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Zambia. It ruled the country for 27 years, from the start of independence from Britain in 1964, but lost power in 1991 after years of corruption, mismanagement and indifference, never to return to the fore again.
During the August 12 Zambian presidential elections, the once all-powerful UNIP, now led by former Anglican bishop Trevor Mwamba, received a mere 3,036 votes, 0.06% of the overall count.
The vote was won by opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema, head of the United Party for National Development (UPND), who beat incumbent Edgar Lungu, the leader of the Patriotic Front (PF).
While in government, the UNIP was led by liberation leader Kenneth Kaunda, who governed the country for 27 years post-independence. His son, Tilyenji Kaunda, succeeded him as leader of the UNIP and presided over the party for 20 years. This is typical of many African independence and liberation parties: their first-generation leaders often try to, or get their descendants to, take over from them in dynastic successions.
In April, Mwamba wrested control of the leadership of the UNIP from Kaunda to become the party’s presidential candidate.
In the post-World War 2 period, African liberation movements that have dominated their countries, then backslide into corruption, incompetence and irrelevance, go one of several ways.
A relative few lose power and, after a spell as opposition, renew themselves, elect new, more honest leaders and adopt new, more relevant policies. They may then return to power, in all cases with significantly smaller majorities. In some cases, they may win power, but only through coalitions and never with absolute majorities.
Some liberation movements, once they lose power, never return to power. Some split into ever smaller groupings until they shut down, to become only footnotes in history.
The UNIP may make an electoral comeback under Mwamba or never return to power again.
Before the UNIP and Kaunda lost power in 1991, no-one in Zambia thought the all-powerful independence party would lose an election. Its supporters could not imagine a country without the UNIP at the helm.
When in power, the party monopolised not only politics and government, but the economy, media and every aspect of civil society. Kaunda and party leaders appointed loyalists to government, state-owned entities (SOEs) and agencies, sport associations, higher education institutions and cultural bodies.
Kaunda banned opposition parties in 1968, saying multiparty democracy was “foreign” and “western”, and fomented tribalism.
That year he nationalised land and local- and foreign-owned companies, initially excluding mines and banks.
However, the next year, he nationalised the mines, while banks such as Barclays, Standard and Grindlays remained in private hands, but were heavily regulated. The government set up three state-owned banks to manage its business, including the Zambia National Commercial Bank. All government business was directed there, making it overnight the largest bank.
The government also nationalised the media, including the Zambia Daily Mail, Times of Zambia and Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation. SOEs by the mid-1970s controlled 80% of the economy, up from 15% in the mid-1970s.
Kaunda introduced “African humanism”, which supposedly blends African traditional communalism with socialist values and Christian practices. The traditional African village became the model for social organisation.
He encouraged communities to organise themselves into cooperatives, engage in mutual aid and practise communalism. Villages across the country were regrouped into new communities.
Over time, the government would fund only the cooperatives in its strongholds. The nationalisation of land immediately collapsed agriculture, food security and export earnings. Most Zambians remain subsistence farmers as they were at independence.
After the 1973 oil crises, the fall in copper prices, capital flight after the nationalisation of land and businesses, corruption and mismanagement of SOEs, the country’s economy collapsed. Zambia plunged into a balance-of-payments crisis, notching up the world’s second-highest debt to GDP.
By the late 1990s, Zambians were poorer, or as poor as they were at independence.
In 1987, Zambia sought a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
He and party loyalists believed their supporters would continue to back them because they were the party of independence, even if they failed cataclysmically in power. Furthermore, Kaunda and UNIP leaders blamed western imperialists, apartheid SA, the IMF and World Bank for the country’s many self-inflicted problems.
The IMF demanded the privatisation of SOEs, the resizing of the public service and social welfare cuts. The austerity reforms caused job losses, basic food and commodity price increases, and utility price increases, plunging many who depended on protected government jobs, social grants and agricultural subsidies into poverty.
In 1987 there was public outrage at the doubling of the consumer price of cornmeal, the staple food in the country. Furthermore, trade unions allied to the UNIP dominated the public sector, opposing a reduction in its size, wage freezes and the employment of honest, competent managers from outside its ranks.
Riots broke out and the police killed a number of protesters. Kaunda then reversed the price increases and rejected the IMF reforms.
He and UNIP refused public calls to seriously tackle corruption, end the deployment of incompetent party cadres who had mismanaged SOEs, bring in talented individuals to help govern and allow opposition parties to openly contest for power. Kaunda prioritised strengthening his grip on the UNIP, recycling the same incompetent, corrupt and indifferent cadres from one government position to the other.
He and party loyalists believed their supporters would continue to back them because they were the party of independence, even if they failed cataclysmically in power. Furthermore, Kaunda and UNIP leaders blamed western imperialists, apartheid SA, the IMF and World Bank for the country’s many self-inflicted problems.
At the end of June 1990, the country plunged into further rioting, with three days of violent protests. Security forces killed 27 people and wounded more than 100 in their hard-fisted efforts to quell the uprising.
On July 1 that year, a group of soldiers led by Lt Mwamba Luchembe attempted a coup. Though its plotters were eventually arrested, the riots, combined with the failed coup, weakened Kaunda and the UNIP.
In August 1991, he and the party, under public and international pressure, enacted a constitution which allowed for parties other than the UNIP. In the election that year, trade union leader Frederick Chiluba won in a landslide, bringing to an end the 27-year rule of the once all-powerful UNIP.
William Gumede is associate professor, School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg).
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