The tripartite alliance between the ANC, SACP, and Cosatu, is at a critical juncture that demands urgent attention. The context, supposedly occasioned by the 2024 election outcome, is pressing and requires innovative and fresh thinking. The demands of 'national unity' bend the alliance to the ideological purpose of which some members are ideologically at variance. For partners to believe the alliance is still a means to some later phase of the revolution, especially in its current form, is not a semantic quibble; it is a serious ideological and moral issue.
Like the weather, the ideological contradictions of or in the alliance have arrived at a point where, to some, they are there to be lived and not resolved. As the complexity of locating the alliance's foundational objects grows, so does its partner's need to identify the various opposites characterising it and determine how they are interdependent relative to the NDR as the vital goal which defines them. The implications of the alliance's decisions on the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) are significant and require thorough analysis.
Without articulating it, the posture of an in-GNU-ANC says that ‘the ultimate NDR objective to transfer power to the people and pursue a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, united, and prosperous South Africa' requires a choice between stability and change. This pursuit is deeply paradoxical. Like in any paradox, and the Alliance has been here before when the GEAR choice was made, the triumph of practical benefit to the dominant has lessened the priority of ideology over the agency of government and leadership.
The power of influencing the voting public, shaping opinions, sparking interest and prompting action must be wrested from past ideologies and refocused on future relevance, specially for those involved in a context-laden historical alliance. Reason must trump ideology; the spats must stop.
When the SACP SG labels the decision to enter into the GNU with the DA as a “betrayal” and a “sell-out of the aspirations of our people”, this attracts the question of what in the strategic intent document, the basis of the GNU can be characterised as 'selling out' or 'betraying'. A clinical unpacking of the statement would yield nothing unless the point of departure of the analysis is not pursuing the liberation promise in the Constitution. Convention in conditions that necessitated a GNU and the truism that no institution or organisation can remain the same throughout history is that political choices have always been a strategy and tactics affair.
The adoption of the 1996 Constitution as a legal terrain through which the NDR would be realised meant that by fiat, the alliance had already then embraced the paradoxical pairs of 'stability and revolution', 'struggle heritage and alliance renewal', 'transfer of power and the rule of law', 'supremacy of the Constitution and that of ideology', 'the centrality of societal needs and the pursuit of ideological objectives'. In as much as it was necessary then for the ANC to adapt or change with the incessantly changing conditions of the social and political totality in which it existed over time, it would have been incongruent with its character if it had not made the choice it did. This historical context weighs heavily on the current situation.
How components of the alliance navigate these questions in a multi-party democracy and a compromised absolute majority power of the ANC will determine the health of the partnership going forward. The time to reflect and pronounce if the universal franchise guaranteed in the Constitution is sufficient to effect 'the transfer of power' referred to in the NDR has arrived. Suppose it is not enough, and there is a need for another way, which differs from the two-thirds majority the MK Party had already defined as a wasted opportunity, which existed during the proverbial nine wasted years; then let it be defined and proposed. The time to disabuse the habit of hostility towards the establishment, which the ANC, a leader of the alliance, is inarguably leading, has arrived.
However, the ANC’s GNU political choice, which the DA insists is a grand coalition, is a triumph of the liberal order as a sequel to its already legal victory in the Constitution. The GNU choice celebrates the arrival of South Africa at a point where only a return to an unlikely two-thirds majority and other majority thresholds can reverse the liberal juggernaut the 1996 Constitution has entrenched. Already, the Constitution obligates all freely elected representatives to "lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people". The concept of an open society makes liberal ideological choices less of a contestable matter, worse if absolute majority power is at current compromised levels.
Before any alliance summit to review the current phase of the NDR, alliance partners need to have genuine conversations within themselves to deal with the choices to be made. There is a compelling need to end the practice of viewing conflicting needs separately and addressing one over the other. Suppose there is a lesson for alliance partners; in that case, the liberation movement can swing from emphasising one part of an interdependent pair, often paradoxical, to focusing on the other. As inevitable as gravity is to natural science, so are paradoxes to interests as the currency of politics, especially when a generation has lost the ideological battle.
Suppose the ANC sold; no one has given a compelling justification for the accusation. Given the balance of forces, this can only be because it engendered a more balanced approach to strategy and tactics. The leadership responsibility under the current circumstances is to find a balance of interdependent opposites in a society stuck in a geographical space tormented by past decisions of an irresponsible generation of racial oligarchs or apartheid architects. 'Interdependent opposites' refers to the idea that seemingly contradictory or opposing forces are often interconnected and interdependent in politics. Understanding and managing these interdependencies is crucial for effective decision-making and strategy formulation.
To stay relevant in this critical phase of defining South Africa within the arrangements it has agreed to govern itself, an appreciation that other people can deliver the liberation promises rather than liberation movement partners is the first logic all should embrace. Still believing in the support liquidated by corruption and state capture as the basis for a claim to be heard is an act of leadership desperation. The tripartite alliance owes it to its relevance to go into various strategic pigeonholes, which refer to specific areas or issues that require strategic planning and action to engage about what is next.
The time has arrived for modern-day Moses Kotanes and JB Markses, leadership that focuses on what defines its mission without wanting to change everybody else’s mission. There will always be a power of ideological positioning, generally if not frequently exaggerated, and there is the power of the voting or approving public, which is difficult to exaggerate. The power of influencing the voting public, shaping opinions, sparking interest, and prompting action must be wrested from past ideologies and refocused on future relevance, especially for those involved in a context-laden historical alliance.
Reason must trump ideology; the spats must stop. Under these conditions, a single mistake made by senior officials within the alliance, like the secretary-general, can potentially harm the alliance's reputation, requiring years to repair. As the complexity of alliance politics increases, so does the complexity of its paradoxes. This will need a continuous convergence of complex minds.
Dr FM Lucky Mathebula is a public policy analyst and the founder of The Thinc Foundation, a think tank based in Tshwane. He is a TUT research and innovation associate.
Would you like to comment on this article?
Sign up (it's quick and free) or sign in now.
Please read our Comment Policy before commenting.