Earlier this month, President Emmerson Mnangagwa declared that his regime would suspend tariffs on US goods entering the country. Though it poses some risks for Zimbabwe’s Sadc neighbours, that wickedly pragmatic move could achieve three short-term strategic outcomes.
First, it put the Zanu-PF party back in international headlines. Autocratic regimes often highly value such media coverage to maintain their grip on power.
Second, it sent a signal to the White House that Zimbabwe is open to exploring a reset in bilateral relations. Given the Mnangagwa government’s track record, this could prove to be a critical move.
Third, it made it more difficult for Zanu-PF opposition to solicit the material support of the US government in its campaign to end the Mnangagwa regime. Improved relations with the US could be a route to regime survival.
Some experts claim that Mnangagwa has single-handedly jeopardised this cornerstone of intraregional trade promotion to advance his own self-interests. If so, then that decision seems to validate the logic that drove the Trump administration's decision to impose the US tariffs in the first place
It would be much easier for Mnangagwa to defeat his opponents if the Central Intelligence Agency and US department of state remained on the sidelines of the intra-Zanu-PF conflict and the US department of treasury repealed economic sanctions that are harming the personal fortunes of Zanu-PF party elites.
The key question, though, is what happens next? The answer will not revolve around the impact that the suspended tariffs on US goods will have on bilateral trade, which is quite small. Instead, it will hinge on whether this pragmatic move opens the door to a future reset of US-Zimbabwe relations.
If that happens, it is reasonable to expect that a mineral deal will be the first order of business to be discussed. The Trump administration has already shown that it is receptive to the idea of providing autocratic regime protection in exchange for critical mineral concessions.
Another important order of business will be the future of Zanu-PF support for South African political parties. The Trump administration wants to put maximum pressure on South African political parties that it deems want to undermine US national security and foreign policy interests. A number of US conservative elites, therefore, want to end the flow of material support from Zanu-PF to the ANC and EFF.
If Mnangagwa is willing to make those sorts of strategic concessions, then the Trump administration might be willing to move forward with a reset in bilateral relations. For some Republicans, however, that might be a bitter pill to swallow. There has been long-standing opposition to Zanu-PF within the US Senate committee on foreign relations, in particular from senator James Risch, the committee chair.
Separately, concerns are being quietly expressed by other Sadc member states that Mnangagwa’s unilateral decision to suspend tariffs on US goods counts as a violation of Sadc rules. Those rules were designed to ensure non-discriminatory tariff treatment among Sadc member states.
Some experts claim Mnangagwa has single-handedly jeopardised this cornerstone of intraregional trade promotion to advance his own self-interests.
If so, then that decision seems to validate the logic that drove the Trump administration's decision to impose the US tariffs in the first place. Trump is sceptical of the concept of international communities of states. He believes the international world is and always will be anarchic.
Over the past few decades, Trump believed that this reality has been obscured by an expensive veil of international order that US taxpayers have largely subsidised. Once that veil is removed, he assumed that other countries would start making decisions in their own self-interest.
For his supporters, Mnangagwa’s decision to suspend tariffs on US goods strongly validates that thinking. In effect, he is prioritising individual interests over group interests in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game of US tariffs. If that observation holds, then that is precisely what the Trump administration expected would happen.
Now the question is whether other Sadc countries will follow suit, particularly Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia. The long-standing bilateral defence ties with the US provides a compelling argument for Botswana to pursue its own interests in responding to US tariffs, and the Lobito Corridor delivers a persuasive argument for Angola, DRC and Zambia to pursue their own interests (or their collective interests as a subgroup) in responding to US tariffs.
To compound matters for the other Sadc members, the US-DRC minerals deal provides an even more compelling argument for the DRC to pursue its own interests in responding to US tariffs. It will therefore be interesting to see how the other Sadc members react in the coming weeks.
If there are more defections, this would not only be detrimental to South Africa's national security, foreign policy and trade interests but also harm the national security, foreign policy and trade interests of other Brics member states, particularly Iran and the People's Republic of China.
• Michael Walsh is a senior fellow in the Africa programme at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Ambassador (Ret) Charles Ray is the former US ambassador to Zimbabwe. He serves as the chair of the Africa programme at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views expressed are their own
For opinion and analysis consideration, email Opinions@timeslive.co.za
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