2025 marks two decades since the AU’s (AU) Ezulwini Consensus. It is called the Ezulwini Consensus because it is the resolution of the AU that was adopted in 2005 at a central valley called Ezulwini in Eswatini.
The AU member states reached a consensus to unite and call for full representation of Africa in all decision-making organs of the United Nations (UN), especially the UN Security Council (UNSC). This full representation of the continent in the Security Council means Africa must have at least two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats, in addition to the current three allocated non-permanent seats, for a total of five. The Ezulwini Consensus resolved that the AU must be responsible for developing criteria and for selecting countries that will represent the continent in the UNSC.
A consensus was also reached that, though the AU does not support the existence of veto powers, but for as long as they still exist in the UNSC, the two permanent seats envisaged for Africa must have the same veto powers as the so-called five superpowers countries (US, China, Russia, France, and UK known as the P5) that currently and exclusively hold veto powers that allow them to be unaccountable for their actions and can overturn Security Council resolutions.
For example, today, the US and Israel continue to attack countries in the Middle East with impunity, and the UNSC cannot decisively act on them because of the economic and military might of the US and its position as one of the so-called permanent members with veto powers.
However, it is important to note that, apart from the Ezulwini Consensus, it has been more than 60 years since Africa’s first call for reform, democratisation and fair representation of the continent in all organs of the UN. In 1963, the precursor to the AU, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), held its first ordinary session of the Council of Ministers in Dakar, Senegal, to discuss and decide on Africa's role and position within the UN and its organs.
The Council of Ministers resolved that the UN should amend its charter to create more seats, ensuring Africa’s just representation and effective participation “in the United Nations work for peace”. Two years after the OAU council session, the UN approved a resolution to increase the number of seats on the UNSC from 11 to 15, allocating three non-permanent seats to Africa. However, the increase in the number of seats did not address the issue of fairer allocation for greater representation and effective participation of Africa in the UNSC.
The reality is that Africa dominates the agenda of the UN Security Council. If humanitarian assistance and the protection of human rights are the cornerstones of the UN’s charter and it’s envisioned international system, then issues of economic, political and military strength should not be considered as criteria for a country to obtain either permanent or non-permanent seats in the Security Council.
Four decades after that slight increase in seats at the UNSC, in 2005, the AU emerged with a more precise African common position and specific proposed seats and reforms for the UNSC, along with a resolute call for veto powers for the proposed two permanent seats, for as long as veto powers exist. It has been more than 20 years now, and the AU is still struggling to ensure its Ezulwini Consensus resolutions are implemented in the UNSC. This necessitates evaluation and assessment of the factors that impede the realisation of the Ezulwini Consensus.
Isabel Badza and Sadiki Maeresera (2019) argue that the current modus operandi of the UNSC does not align with the New World Order (multipolar system), which aims for sustainable peace, security and the re-humanisation of the international system. Arguably, Africa deserves permanent and additional non-permanent seats with veto powers, as espoused by the Ezulwini Consensus, alongside its existing members with permanent seats on the UNSC.
Because Africa represents almost 30% of UN general membership, the continent accounts for more than 70% of the global conflicts, with more than 80% of the displaced and refugee people in the world. For example, in 2012, there was a complex violent conflict in Mali, which both the AU and the Economic Community of Western African States (Ecowas) struggled to resolve and resorted to appealing for help from the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato). Africa must cease to be a beggar to Western countries and international institutions; it must be a part of decisionmakers and a critical player in the multipolar world, due to its position as a home to abundant critical minerals worldwide.
The reality is that Africa dominates the agenda of the UN Security Council. If humanitarian assistance and the protection of human rights are the cornerstones of the UN’s charter and it’s envisioned international system, then issues of economic, political and military strength should not be considered as criteria for a country to obtain either permanent or non-permanent seats in the Security Council. That should be done within the context of creating a humane and egalitarian New World Order.
It has been 20 years since the Ezulwini Consensus, and the AU still has not developed specific criteria for selecting its representatives for the proposed permanent and non-permanent seats at the UNSC. This delay and divisions among African countries on how to implement their consensus at the UN are among the factors that hinder progress.
For instance, on July 18 2005, Africa had the opportunity to present its Ezulwini Consensus before the 59th session of the UN General Assembly. Africa’s consensus needed at least two-thirds of the votes and at least a support of the so-called P5. However, during the lobbying processes it was clear that the consensus had some convincing support, but the countries of the G4 (namely Brazil, India, Japan and Germany) were willing to support African countries for the UNSC reform and crease of seats, on condition that African countries water down their resolutions and abandon the issues of veto for new permanent members. At that time, Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria were the possible contenders for the two permanent seats.
Then, South Africa, led by then-president Thabo Mbeki, and Nigeria, led by then-president Olusegun Obasanjo, attempted to convince the AU and its member states to tactically abandon their veto powers for new permanent members, as suggested by the G4 countries; so that the African common position could gain enough votes and later revisit the abandoned position. Unfortunately, countries such as Algeria and Egypt opposed that proposal; apparently, Egypt was criticised for being biased towards Arabic countries and abandoning the collective interests of the continent. Egypt was also critical of Nigeria, accusing it of trying to act as a big brother to other African countries. Ultimately, the African common position did not receive enough votes at the General Assembly.
A decade later, in 2015, the debate on UNSC reforms was reignited and intensified, with member states being asked to clarify their positions. Once again, African countries remained divided on who should represent the continent in the proposed seats. However, the continent remained resolute in its common position regarding the Ezulwini Consensus.
Marina Magalhães Barreto Leite da Silva (2015) reveals that “the inability to agree on countries with the capacity to represent the region has been the main problem of the African group in terms of challenges related to reform ... at the same time, the five African powers-Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya-presented themselves as the most suitable candidates”. African countries are united on a common position but divided on the modalities and approaches for effectively implementing the 2005 resolution.
In February 2026, the AU needs to develop specific criteria and then select countries that will represent the continent at the UNSC, for permanent and non-permanent seats, thereby fostering unity and understanding, and strengthening the African voice.
Perhaps at the next UN General Assembly, Africa should critically assess its numerical strengths; if necessary, it should consider the initial proposal of the G4 countries, which was supported by South Africa and Nigeria in 2005. After this, upon securing seats, the discussion regarding new members with permanent seats may then be reignited, with Africa advocating for the abolition of veto powers in the UNSC. Sometimes, tactical flexibility is necessary to achieve the strategic goal.
• Orapeleng Matshediso is a master’s graduate of Pan African Development Studies and research associate at the University of Johannesburg (Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation). The author is also an alumnus of the then Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute
For opinion and analysis consideration, email opinions@timeslive.co.za
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