Zuma gave the woema to the SSA’s dirtiest dealings, state capture probe told

He pocketed millions, wanted to handle judges and bribe journalists, Sydney Mufamadi says in jaw-dropping testimony

Former South African president Jacob Zuma turned the State Security Agency into his own intelligence structures, the Zondo commission heard this week.
Former South African president Jacob Zuma turned the State Security Agency into his own intelligence structures, the Zondo commission heard this week. (Kim Ludbrook/Pool via REUTERS)

Former president Jacob Zuma, as the head of state and ANC boss, turned the State Security Agency (SSA) into his personal fiefdom, the state capture inquiry heard on Monday.

If Zuma was not allegedly financially benefiting from SSA coffers, he was using the agency to persecute his enemies and thwart public dissent against his administration or provide protection to his political allies.

This was the jaw-dropping evidence of former minister of safety and security Sydney Mufamadi, who chaired the High-Level Review Panel that lifted the lid on the rot that set in at the SSA.

According to Mufamadi, two people were central in doing Zuma’s dirty work, erstwhile minister of state security David Mahlobo and former SSA special operations unit boss Thulani Dlomo.

The special operations unit, Mufamadi testified, was nothing more than a “parallel intelligence structure” aimed at serving Zuma’s political factional interests.  

Sometimes it was successful, while other covert operations flopped spectacularly.

It remains a mystery, even to the High-Level Review Panel, whether certain operations were carried through. Ironically, the operations on which the panel could not definitively conclude were those that placed Zuma at the “crime scene”.

One, said Mufamadi, was “Project Commitment”, which pledged large amounts of money for Zuma’s benefit monthly between the 2015 and 2017 financial years.

Mufamadi said each special ops operation had a designated person who 'went to the window' to collect money for missions.

Mufamadi said each special ops operation had a designated person who “went to the window” to collect money for missions.

Project Commitment was no different and the cash collector testified to the panel that in the 2015-16 financial year, he handed over R1.5m cash monthly to Mahlobo, on the understanding that it was for Zuma.

“The movement of money was cash-based,” said Mufamadi.

The agent who delivered these money bags to Mahlobo, said Mufamadi, further testified that the amounts were hiked to R4.5m in the 2016-17 financial year, Zuma’s last days as the country’s and ANC president.

Mufamadi said the special ops unit was run in an “unconstitutional and illegal” fashion and its operatives pledged allegiance to Zuma instead of the country.

This after they were recruited from outside the SSA and received training from Russia. They were not permanently absorbed into the agency’s permanent staff while working on missions reserved for permanent staff.

Worse, Mufamadi added, special ops agents did not report to SSA management, but directly to the executive, particularly the minister of state security, who would report to Zuma.

“You had projects that rested with the SSA which did not need the recruitment of people other than those in the full-time employ of the agency to carry those tasks, but the special operations unit enabled the employment of agents on [a] temporary basis and of people from outside SAA,” said Mufamadi.

“We heard complaints about the non-governability of these outside members. They considered themselves to be accountable to members of the executive rather than management structures of SSA. That included them coming forward with requisitions for funding for operations, but when they account, they would say, ‘we do not account to you’.”

The special ops unit, Mufamadi opined, was a “rogue unit”.

And its boss, Dlomo, when he was summoned for an interview by the High-Level Review Panel, refused to co-operate fully, while former agents of the unit were singing like canaries as they were “aggrieved because they were promised to be absorbed permanently”, which never happened.

Other missions included an operation to recruit judges and handle them to yield positive court outcomes on Zuma cases.

Among successful missions of the special ops unit, said Mufamadi, was the neutralisation and infiltration of the Zuma Must Fall Movement, particularly in February 2016 at the state of the nation address (Sona) in parliament.

The movement, SSA believed at the time, planned to call for Zuma’s head outside parliament in the form of a 5,000-people protest, but after SSA spooks infiltrated them and destabilised their plans, the turnout was just 50 people.

But the unit was also rocked by some monumental failures, including an attempt to stop then ANC deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa’s campaign for the ANC top job.

Ramaphosa emerged as party president at the 2017 ANC Nasrec elective conference.

Another mission that flopped spectacularly was its attempt to delegitimise the Fees Must Fall movement, which was demanding fee-free tertiary education for children of the poor.

Other missions included an operation, headed by Mahlobo, to recruit judges and handle them to yield positive court outcomes in Zuma cases.

The media was also targeted through “Project Wave”, which sought to bribe domestic and foreign reporters to praise the Zuma administration and look the other way when things fell apart.

Zuma’s family also benefited, particularly his then estranged wife, Nompumelelo Ntuli, through “Project Tinroof”, which allocated her a safe house while it was secretly investigating her for Zuma’s alleged poisoning.

As if that was not enough, special ops forked out R1.5m a month for “Project Khusela”, a toxicology operation “to check expiry dates of cool drinks” that were to be consumed by Zuma.

“It was a very expensive exercise indeed,” said Mufamadi.

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