If the mess in SA’s security cluster is not fixed, we are in trouble

Did anyone in the security cluster have advance knowledge of the planned unrest? And if so, who? What role did the ministers play in the run-up to and during events — and what is their role in the aftermath?

Intelligence usually emanates from the State Security Agency (SSA), which will notify police if there is a specific threat. If it is of a serious nature, the president will be informed directly by minister of state security Ayanda Dlodlo. The police will then see to it that members in affected areas are informed and prepared.

The minister of defence, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, would be part of the group because the defence force has to act in the country’s interest. Risk analyst Dr Nel Marais, who has an intelligence background, says there are a number of circumstances in which the SSA may ask for input from the defence force and police. 

The defence force’s defence intelligence and the police’s crime intelligence complete the picture with the SSA. For example, in the run-up to emotions boiling over the position of former president Jacob Zuma, the SSA would have consulted the defence force and police on what they had heard on the ground. 

“If there had been talk of regime change, Dlodlo would have gone straight to [President] Cyril Ramaphosa to warn him. Did that happen?” Marais asked. There is also the issue — given divisions within the ruling party — that the complete picture might not have been analysed and worded properly for police and the defence force to have had proper guidance on what steps to take.

Three failures 

“There were three clear intelligence failures [in the three departments’ inadequate actions] and it boiled down to the fact that nobody believed [despite all the social and political instigation] the crowds would participate spontaneously,” he said.

A case in point were the attacks on trucks that kicked off the recent crisis in KwaZulu-Natal. These were a repeat of earlier attacks, but have the causes of these strikes been properly analysed? Marais argues it had been evident that tensions were mounting. The orchestrators of the protests simply used Zuma’s arrest for contempt of court to strike the match that would spark widespread criminality.

“It was a tactical failure, as is evident in the deployment of police manpower. There were no reinforcements at shopping centres and ATMs. Evaluation of the situation was poor.”

The planners knew police and defence force reinforcements would use the main routes to get to KwaZulu-Natal flashpoints and therefore torched at least 30 trucks on the freeway, blocking it. This left police and the defence force stranded.

In the run-up to Zuma’s arrest police did expect the mobilisation of supporters, ostensibly to defend him. More than 1,000 public order police officers were deployed in and around Nkandla. They had been dispatched from the Western Cape, presumably to be impartial, as police in KwaZulu-Natal might have hesitated to act against their own.

After Zuma handed himself over to police, these officers were sent home. This points to a poor reading of the situation. They had barely left when all hell broke loose in the province.

Fires and excuses

It is important to know in which camp the security cluster ministers are, Marais explains. Mapisa-Nqakula is mainly a Ramaphosa loyalist. She wouldn’t deliberately have allowed the violence to happen, but might have used the ravaged defence budget as an excuse for the defence force not to act. 

She confirmed this indirectly before the joint parliamentary committee on defence when she said Ramaphosa had asked for 25,000 boots on the ground, regardless of the cost. The defence force initially made a meagre 2,500 troops available.

Marais is of the opinion that police minister Bheki Cele is not pro-Zuma; Cele is only pro-Cele and is convinced he is always right. He did, however, help Ramaphosa gain support in KwaZulu-Natal before the last election and is unlikely to have deliberately allowed the violence to develop. “The answer is more likely to be in his relationship with the national police commissioner (Khehla Sitole).”

Cele and Sithole can’t stand each other and the opinion in police ranks is that they do not listen to each other. When Cele defended himself last week, throwing Dlodlo under the bus with regard to insufficient intelligence, it may well be that he had never listened to what Sitole and other representatives have tried to tell him in Natjoint, the body where seniors from all national security departments caucus.

Dlodlo too is understood to be in the Ramaphosa camp. While she has defended her portfolio’s and department’s reputation with all her might, the internal strife in the SSA has surfaced at the Zondo commission into state capture. The revelations left no doubt that the department has been decimated. 

“One would have expected the SSA to use surveillance to monitor everyone in the Zuma camp’s interaction on social media and elsewhere,” said Marais. “But you also have to look at the role of the ANC leadership in KwaZulu-Natal. Did they really know nothing or did they have a hand in the unrest?” 

A helping hand from Eastern Europe?

According to Marais, the SSA has been asking for new electronic surveillance technology for a long time as the existing systems are ageing and outdated. These systems are, however, expensive to replace. To complicate matters further, the capabilities of some new technology could violate privacy laws.

It is a nightmare to monitor all social media, made worse by the encryption of messages on certain apps. It would have been more useful to focus on only the Zuma faction to identify agitators.

An electronic intelligence specialist told Vrye Weekblad his analysis showed there were specific profiles at the forefront of the instigation. Many of these were traced back to Germany, Romania and other Eastern European countries.

“There was definitely foreign involvement, also in the run-up, and it was from Eastern Europe. Analysis of some of the hashtags shows it is highly unlikely that an accidental supporter in Romania would have understood the context if it had not been agreed upon beforehand.”

As it happens, there was some media speculation in the past week or so on deputy president David Mabuza’s return from Russia after he travelled there in late June for treatment of an undisclosed medical condition.

The data basis of NSO, Israeli manufacturers of Pegasus spyware, was exposed last week. It emerged that Rwanda requested Ramaphosa’s cellphone to be hacked in 2019. The president is among 14 world leaders, diplomats, journalists and senior government officials who have been spied on by the NSO.

NSO provides information gathered by a target’s cellphone receiver to governments and high-profile business entities. The targeted cellphone provides information gained from discussions in its range and phone calls.

According to the cyber specialist, the Israeli system is used predominantly by supporters of the Western model of cyber espionage. Many opposition groups, including the ANC’s radical economic transformation (RET) faction, are believed to prefer similar systems developed and used by Russia. “Analysts should investigate the possibility of direct or indirect Eastern European involvement in the instigation of last week’s violence,” the specialist said.

Marais argues that a thorough trend analysis is needed to expose the failures in the SSA, police and defence force in order to correct their reaction capabilities and to hold those responsible accountable. 

Poor police leadership and soft bullets

Institute for Security Studies senior analyst Willem Els does not mince his words when pointing out problems in the security cluster.

“Incompetent people have been appointed in positions where they have to make decisions and do planning. The systematic erosion of authority and capacity has caused the collapse of the security apparatus.

“This is not a matter of white or black — it is about competence. I have worked with very competent black people, but they have been marginalised because they show up the incompetent people in senior positions.”

An army general who was, until recently, involved in joint operational planning, told Vrye Weekblad the police are their own worst enemy due to poor leadership and a lack of strategic and tactical insight. This is then perpetuated by poor logistical management, as was the case when police members were left stranded without the appropriate weapons and ammunition.

Trade union Solidarity’s coordinator of police matters, Renate Barnard, said Marikana was a turning point in that the police’s fire power was reduced. The Farlam commission ruled, inter alia, the rubber in crowd control ammunition was too powerful. The rubber density was more than halved.

“If a person with thick layers of clothing is hit by a rubber bullet, it will simply bounce off. The instigators are very well aware of that.”  

Weapons and equipment

As far back as 2011 an internal audit found there were no longer parts available for the police’s R5 rifles. Key pieces were ordered from South America, but they exploded in tests and were returned.

Police buy their ammunition on tender, a drawn-out process with many opportunities for corruption. According to Barnard, a multitude of police members are awaiting trial on corruption charges related to these contracts or have already been sentenced. This has led to sluggishness in awarding further tenders.

Police stocks of stun and smoke grenades are desperately low and the little available can only be fired with the old R1 rifles. These rifles are even harder to come by. According to internal regulations, only public order units are allowed to use rubber bullets. In reality this means that if the flying squad or any other unit is sent to a crime scene, police officers only have sharp-point ammunition. When someone is shot, as has often happened, police are criticised from all quarters.

“As a rule, minimum violence should be used while criminals shoot at police with sharp-point bullets. Police officers have to drive in soft-skinned vehicles when crowds pelt them with bricks. As a consequence, these vehicles are dilapidated and it could be months before they are fixed,” explained Barnard.

Added to these woes is the collapse of Denel, which would at least have been able to supplement ammunition in an emergency, added Barnard.

“With our security cluster in disarray we are in trouble,” said Els. Plasters will no longer hold it together.

Troops not geared for urban violence

Soldiers are not meant to be deployed against urban violence and their equipment is not suitable for it. The defence force is a blunt war machine that should be a last resort in this role and then only in support of police, according to defence experts.

The defence force can’t deploy itself. Only when police ask for assistance and the president authorises the deployment can a force be sent into an emergency situation. 

Apart from its budgetary constraints, the defence force has had to ready a contingent of soldiers and equipment for deployment in Mozambique as part of an SADC intervention force. It is also involved in peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in border patrols.

Units from across the country had to be flown to Durban and Pretoria in two ageing air force Hercules C130 carriers. There was also a shortage of armoured cars, despite promises of Cuban mechanical assistance. Planes and aircraft are far behind service schedules because of Denel’s collapse.

The real problem, however, was a lack of cooperation. The national police commissioner and the head of the defence force used to meet regularly to discuss matters of mutual interest. This has not happened since before 2005, when former general Siphiwe Nyanda was head of the defence force and Andre Pruis the police commissioner. The same applies to joint exercises and efforts to standardise communications.

The military has no non-deadly weapons and no doctrine for how to apply crowd control. Internal domestic operations are not even detailed in the military strategy and operations, if they happen, are left to field commanders’ interpretations.

At provincial level in the joint operations centres (JOCs) there is representation by all the security forces, but the army tactical provincial commanders are not allowed to decide for themselves to deploy in support of the police unless this has highest-level approval.

Thwarted by the N3 

The mobility of the army was hampered by the closure of the N3 freeway. There were no strategic fuel supplies available for military vehicles and there was a lack of basic essentials, such as sufficient ration packs to feed a few thousand soldiers. 

The lack of operational experience has, according to Vrye Weekblad sources, resulted in the army being overextended, underfunded and faced with unrealistic expectations. Nonetheless, when commander-in-chief Ramaphosa gave the army the order, it was visible nationally within two days. This knocked the steam out of the protesters and looters, and saw them fade from the streets.

Mapisa-Nqakula had said the army was guarding national key points, but even those are not clearly defined within the security cluster. It is not even clear what is meant by “guarding” or “protecting”, and what a soldier in an armoured vehicle must do if a group of extremists wants to blow up a power station.

“There is simply no contingency planning in the security cluster to deal with attacks on the scale of those seen in Mumbai in 2008 or the terror siege of the shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013, or any similar urban disaster. If there is an extremist attack of this sort in South Africa, we are in trouble,” predicts one expert.

If the ministers in question already get under each others’ feet and contradict themselves, there is a deep and thorough review and assessment needed. After all, the weak points are now there for all to see.

* This article first appeared in Vrye Weekblad.