Mothballing, 'sabotage' and other reasons for power crisis gloom

Last month, Eskom introduced load-shedding for the first time since 2008. Despite a massive capital investment in South Africa's electricity infrastructure in the interim, the utility has over the past six years faced a raft of problems - financial and logistical - that have contributed to today's crisis.

This is how the battle between electricity supply and demand has played itself out.

'80s: There is excessive power supply and Eskom mothballs three coal-fired power stations.

1994: The advent of democracy brings massive economic and infrastructural growth, placing huge demand on electricity supply. In an attempt to deregulate Eskom, the government blocks the utility's attempts to build new power stations, bring the three mothballed stations back online or significantly grow its transmission capacity.

Late '90s: As no private sector bidders come forward, there is effectively no new investment in South Africa's electricity infrastructure, putting the network under increasing strain.

1998: The Department of Minerals and Energy produces its white paper on energy. It warns, among other things, that unless "timely steps are taken to ensure that demand does not exceed available supply capacity", the network would reach its capacity limit by 2007.

2001: Eskom is converted from being a statutory body to Eskom Holdings Ltd, a public company, to come into effect in July 2002. It is to have a board of directors, with the minister of minerals and energy as the shareholder representative.

December 2005: Unit 1 at Koeberg power station is shut down after a bolt is left in a generator, damaging the 200-ton rotor and resulting in widespread blackouts across the Western and Northern Cape while new parts are ordered.

January 2006: Eskom reports that it needs more than R100-billion over the next five years to boost its generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure.

February 28 2006: Public enterprises minister Alec Erwin states on national television: "This is not, in fact, an accident. Any interference with any electricity installation is an exceptionally serious crime. It is sabotage."

August 7 2006: Presenting an official government report on the Koeberg incident, Erwin states: "The cause of the damage to the generators is the question that has caused massive public interest. Of as much interest has been whether I said that this was an act of sabotage. I did not say this."

October 2007: The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that Eskom is forced to introduce rolling blackouts across the country. These are done in two-hour windows. Eskom moves to bring its mothballed stations back online and introduce new generating plants. It is also reported that problems with coal supplies and a huge skills crisis at Eskom have contributed to the emergency.

November 2007: Eskom awards contracts worth R33-billion to build the dry-cooled, coal-fired Medupi power station in Limpopo. It is Eskom's largest single investment to date. It is scheduled to be online by the end of 2012.

December 2007: After meeting Eskom, president Thabo Mbeki states: "When Eskom said to the government 'We think we must invest more in terms of electricity generation', we said: 'No, but all you will be doing is just to build excess capacity.' We said: 'Not now, later.' We were wrong. Eskom was right. We were wrong."

January 2008: Eskom stops exporting electricity to its neighbours as a result of its deteriorating domestic situation.

January 24 2008: After months of rolling blackouts, the disparity between supply and demand reaches a crisis point and Eskom declares an "emergency or force majeure". A plea is made for customers to reduce usage, and major industrial consumers shut down consumption.

February 2008: Eskom is bailed out to the tune of about R60-billion by the National Treasury after a dire 2007-08 financial year.

April 2008: South Africa is introduced to regular, scheduled load-shedding for the first time, in an attempt to manage the disparity between supply and demand and to allow coal reserves to be replenished ahead of winter. Eskom defines load-shedding as "a measure of last resort to prevent the collapse of the power system countrywide". The scheme is implemented, affecting homes, businesses and public institutions such as hospitals and clinics.

2008: The National Energy Regulator of South Africa publishes a report saying that load-shedding cost the economy R50-billion in 2008.

February 2009: The Treasury grants Eskom R176-billion in loan guarantees over five years to help it raise funds to boost capacity.

June 2009: The energy regulator approves an average price increase of 31.3% for Eskom, to help it raise revenue.

February 2011: An explosion rips through a turbine at Duvha power station outside eMalahleni, Mpumalanga. Damage is estimated at R3.3-billion. The turbine spun out of control after the shutdown mechanism failed.

2012: Eskom's executives get about R31-million in "performance bonuses".

December 2012: The initial deadline for the Medupi power station to be brought online is missed. It is set back until the end of 2013.

December 2013: The second deadline for Medupi power station to be brought online is missed. It is now expected to be online by the end of 2014. The cost stands at R105-billion.

April 2014: Unit 3 at Eskom's Duvha power station is shut down after an "an apparent over-pressurisation incident" led to it being damaged.

April 2014: Public enterprises minister Malusi Gigaba states that action will be taken against those responsible for delays at Medupi: "Necessary penalties will be at hand should any delays be experienced. Heads will roll."

June 2014: Eskom's credit rating is downgraded by Fitch ratings agency to "negative".

July 2014: Moody's rating agency downgrades Eskom's standalone credit quality.

November 1 2014: A crack in the central coal storage silo at Eskom's Majuba power station ruptures and collapses the silo, halting coal delivery to the station. The station is responsible for roughly 10% of South Africa's electricity capacity.

November 20 2014: It is revealed that a second silo at Majuba is cracked. The silo is taken out of commission for safety reasons.

December 2014: A new round of load-shedding is introduced as a result of broken generators and summer maintenance. It is set to continue into 2015. Three stages of severity are planned for, with stage three representing the most critical threat to the integrity of the national grid.

December 7 2014: Eskom spokesman Andrew Etzinger warns: "There is a risk of a [total] blackout." Although possible, Eskom emphasises it is unlikely.

December 12 2014: President Jacob Zuma attributes the crisis to apartheid, saying: "The problem [is] the energy was structured racially to serve a particular race, not the majority."