It survived two world wars, two global epidemics (the flu in 1918, HIV/Aids from the '80s), a major global depression, a 50-year threat from communism, the dismantling of colonialism in Africa and apartheid. In the face of everything the 20th century threw at Anglo American, not only did this former powerful South Africa-based conglomerate survive, it positively thrived. It now turns out what Anglo couldn't handle was democracy and globalisation.The conglomerate that once controlled 60% of the JSE is fighting for its life. Analysts say it will need a capital injection to survive and avoid being the subject of a takeover.story_article_left1No doubt some of the long-term shareholders are looking back nostalgically on the heydays of National Party rule and wondering if the group's demise was inevitable.Could it have become too dependent on apartheid-era laws and restrictions to make it on the global stage? Or has the global stage become too tough for all players?Jean Pierre Verster of 36ONE Asset Management said everyone was under pressure. "Things may be worse for Anglo because it bought a lot of assets at the top of the commodity cycle."Verster said everything that could go wrong for mining companies had gone wrong. "There are no signs of green shoots in this industry."But one former executive director reckons Anglo caused a lot of its own problems. "A series of bad decisions and poor executive appointments dating back to the mid-'90s sealed the group's fate," said the former director.He questioned why the group felt it had to externalise its operations, and having taken the decision to externalise, why it chose London rather than Switzerland."London is not a mining centre, it's a financial centre. As a South African company, it would have been better to go to Switzerland, like Richemont did," he said.mini_story_image_vright1Too much regulation, too little knowledge about mining and Afro-pessimism were just some of the drawbacks to a London listing."There's also the nonsense of having to appoint 'City' grandees to a London-listed board regardless of their competence."SAB's success despite the London challenges was down to the calibre of its top team, led by Graham Mackay and firm anchor shareholders. Anglo had nothing similar.The decision to focus on mining, its area of operational expertise, and to seek a listing in London, involved the sale of all Anglo's non-mining investments. Anglo managed to gain political kudos when, in the late '90s, it sold off a large chunk of its industrial assets to an unwieldy and poorly financed BEE consortium.The assets contained in Johnnic included substantial stakes in South African Breweries, Premier Food, MTN, and Times Media Group (previously South African Associated Newspapers). Separate deals saw the sale of The Argus and FirstRand. Finally, in 2007, Mondi was unbundled."The London analysts didn't understand or tolerate the concept of conglomerate," said the former director. He said although sanctions and government restrictions had forced Anglo to spend its mining profits on South African assets, it had worked well for the company and its shareholders."When the mining cycle was weak, we had income from our industrial investments. Imagine if Anglo still had its stakes in SAB[Miller], FirstRand and Mondi?"However, Des Kilalea of RBC said the London listing had the considerable benefit of Anglo's inclusion in the FTSE 100."This meant all the tracker funds had to be in Anglo, London was the right place." He said Anglo's problems were not caused by its London listing or its focus on mining. "It had poor leadership, which made bad decisions."story_article_left2The worst of those decisions was that taken by then CEO Cynthia Carroll in 2008. The $5.5-billion spent on Brazil's Minas-Rio always looked like a late and desperate bid to get increased exposure to the iron-ore boom.In 2007, the board of City grandees had replaced Tony Trahar with Carroll in part because of his reluctance to buy major mining assets."Minas-Rio had been offered to us in the late '90s for a few hundred million dollars. We investigated it, but turned it down for a variety of reasons," said the former director.Carroll did not consult any of the team members that undertook the investigation. The full cost of the Minas-Rio project came to around $13-billion, much of which will be written off.And while he avoided massive acquisition-related costs, Trahar caused almost as much damage to Anglo's balance sheet when he spent $10.5-billion repurchasing shares. In 2009, the repurchased shares were worth just $3-billion.As shareholders contemplate the latest grim results, they may be tempted to think nostalgically about Anglo's days as a powerful South African conglomerate.crottya@sundaytimes.co.za..