ARE plans for the re-enactment of the 1949 national conference of the ANC still on track?

If they are, ANC Youth League president Julius Malema will probably not be cast in the leading role.

In fact, it is possible that he will just be an extra, watching from the sidelines. But, is there any point in writing about Malema and the ANC, given that the world is supposedly ending in December?

Maybe this should be my last sentence on ANC internal battles. But this could turn out to be another false prophesy, so I should explain, briefly, why Malema and the ANC Youth League want President Jacob Zuma to sing the 1949 blues.

To cut a long story short, two things happened at the 1949 conference. Firstly, AB Xuma, who had rejected proposals from the youth league for a radical shift in political strategy and tactics, was booted out of the presidency of the ANC.

Secondly, the youth league won the battle for the radicalisation of the ANC.

That strategic change in direction altered the course of South African history. The outcome of the 1949 conference set in motion a train of events that led to the defiance and pass campaigns of the 1950s, the Sharpeville Massacre, the banning of the ANC in 1960 and the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe in 1961.

While the context is that of a democratic South Africa, Malema and the youth league have set themselves the twin objectives of radicalising the content of economic policy and removing Zuma as ANC president.

If the balance of forces and support in the ANC stay the same, they will achieve neither.

The possibility, therefore, is that Malema and his supporters will be singing the blues.

With the appeals committee having upheld Malema's conviction by the disciplinary committee of the ANC on charges of bringing the party into disrepute and sowing division, can the youth league play a critical role in policy and leadership battles in the lead-up to the Mangaung conference?

Will there be any policy and leadership battles at all?

We cannot rule out the possibility that the battle for Mangaung will end up being what in Zulu is called umlilo wamaphepha (paper fire), which burns with impressive ferocity but does so for a very short time.

With Malema out of the picture, a leadership vacuum caused by his neutralisation, the fracturing of the remaining leadership and strategic and tactical differences, may undermine the capacity of the youth league to influence the outcome of leadership and policy battles.

On the policy front, it seems the nationalisation debate is dying a slow death, although it is also clear the ANC will push for a rethink on the terms of engagement between mining sector and state.

The debate is gravitating towards defining the extent of state involvement in the mining sector and the adoption of a mix of rent-seeking measures.

Therefore, the political battle will most probably be more interesting than the policy battle.

There is a strong possibility of a decoupling of support for Malema from attempts to unseat the president. In other words, those who have developed an antipathy towards Zuma, and had hoped Malema would be their vehicle to this end, may elect to align themselves with anti-Malema factions seeking to limit Zuma to a single presidential term.

The problem is, however, that they still do not have a candidate to challenge the president. The leadership battle will either be a damp squib or a challenger will emerge at the last minute before the presidential election in Mangaung.

We should not rule out the possibility of a challenger flying under the radar until he is nominated from the floor. If this scenario applies to Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe, he has strategic and tactical options to consider.

If the Malema disciplinary matter is put on the agenda of the ANC's national executive committee, Motlanthe may choose to keep quiet and run the risk of alienating those who want him to run against Zuma.

On the other hand, he can alienate them by taking an unambiguous stand against Malema, and win the support of the anti-Malema and anti-Zuma camps.

But we must always make room for a black swan scenario on both the policy and political fronts.

Ten months is a very long time in South African and ANC politics.

• Matshiqi is a Research Fellow at the Helen Suzman Foundation. This article first appeared on Creamer Media's Polity at www.polity.org.za