Blondes, brothels and rhinos...

Former agents of a rouge unit set up by SARS employees to spy on high profile people reveal some of its bizarre inner workings. What follows are the stories of agents who worked in the rouge SARS unit.

AGENT 1

During my tenure at the unit, I came across the following issues that made me uncomfortable:

Brothel

The unit's team members were encouraged by Skollie to create a cover as we were working from home and the neighbours were suspicious. I informed my neighbours that I was on suspension with full pay. One of the agents opened a club/brothel. I came to know about it as he was pestering one of our colleagues for the "two blondes' money". It transpired that this agent took two prostitutes from the club to his hotel and did not pay. The brothel-owning agent also arranged prostitutes for other members when they visited Durban. I was very much unhappy about the brothel as a South African Revenue Service employee was also pimping young women. Some of the unit members also had companies that were doing business with SARS/the government.

Psychological profiling on unit members

Unit members were subjected to psychometric testing by two of their colleagues . Psychological profiling was also done on the members . .. by the two psychologists in the team, not by an independent party. This is not only illegal but unethical as they can use the results against the members. This practice also extended to taxpayers who were being investigated by SARS.

Unit members working as VIP bodyguards

Some of the unit members were working as VIP bodyguards for politicians while working for SARS. At least one individual did not have the experience or even a firearm to work as a bodyguard. The members were also not registered with the security industry regulatory body. One member who worked as a VIP bodyguard indicated that the cover allowed them to eavesdrop on some of the politicians' conversations. During one of the car-racing meetings at Kyalami, some of the unit members were protecting senior ANC members.

Mike Peega

Mike was fired after he was arrested for rhino poaching. Mike claimed he was asked to infiltrate the poaching syndicate but SARS denied any knowledge after he was arrested.

Was the unit a cover for something?

While I was at the unit, I was under the impression that we were gathering intelligence for SARS's national enforcement unit. When I later joined the national enforcement unit [now called national projects], I made a follow-up on the cases that I worked on while at the unit. None of the evidence/intelligence that I collected reached the national enforcement unit. For example, I was tasked to work on John Bredenkamp and prepared a dossier on his cigarette smuggling and arms deals. I later suspected that the reason that I was allocated the case was to get access to the enigmatic Fana Hlongwane [a key figure in the arms scandal]. I used two of the team members in the unit to debrief him ... We solicited information on the arms deal and commission paid to Bredenkamp.

Prominent journalist

While working on the Bredenkamp matter, I was struggling to get an interview with the journalist who was working on the arms deal story. One of the unit members volunteered to assist me and told me that he's got the journalist by "his balls". The journalist flew to Pretoria to meet me after my colleagues intervened.

The ex-Scorpions members

About eight members of the unit came from the Directorate of Special Operations, or Scorpions. The members previously raided the house of JZ in Forest Town [Joburg] when they were with the directorate. One of the members was also previously caught by law enforcement agencies conducting surveillance on former police commissioner Jackie Selebi. These members had a history of targeting senior ANC members. The same members were offended when one team member attended a unit meeting at a lodge wearing an ANC shirt.

The ex-directorate members were highly paid but were the least experienced in the team. When the African team members started revolting, they were told to rejoin another unit in SARS as the ex-directorate members had left SARS and the unit was being disbanded. The members continued to work for SARS undercover.

Race determined salary

All the white staff members of the unit were appointed at grade 7 level or above. Out of the six grade 8 positions in the unit, five were white. The human resource consultant who handled our appointment was on grade 6. He then appointed himself as a "specialist - enforcement" (grade 7). I asked the agent about the discrepancies in the salary of the members. He indicated that the white members would never get another opportunity to get promotion and the African members should not worry as affirmative action would "sort them out".

Counter-intelligence

All the computers in the team were first issued to an agent to "clean" before they were allocated. It later transpired that he was installing spyware on the SARS computers.

Disturbing stories

Unit members indicated that two agents were present when Leonard Radebe [who was tipped to be the next commissioner of SARS] met [alleged tax dodger] Dave King at a restaurant in Muldersdrift [in Gauteng]. It was alleged that Radebe' s unceremonious exit from SARS was orchestrated by the unit .

At that time it was stated that CCTV footage of the restaurant was used to confront Radebe. I did not see the footage, but CCTV cameras are normally mounted on the top and the angle will also be different if the footage was taken by a person sitting opposite you. Should it be proved that the agents took the footage, the next question to be asked is: was Radebe's phone bugged, or how did the two know about the meeting?

It was also alleged that two agents arranged a meeting with Moe Shaik to offer him the file on the psychological profiling of a "star witness" in the Jacob Zuma corruption trial. The witness mentioned is the secretary of an arms deal company who was due to testify about the encrypted fax. The plan was to offer the file and record the transaction, which could either be used against JZ or help him beat the corruption charges. I am not aware if the transaction took place.

AGENT 2

The team members were advised to build or create an extra room at their houses to serve as an office.

Each member was working from his or her private residence. Team meetings were held on weekly and monthly bases.

Teams

The members were divided into separate teams. I was under the monitoring group.

Equipment

Team members were given laptops or computers, 3G cards, printers and stationery. They were furnished with false ID cards with false names for operational use. Operational equipment such as binoculars and cameras were made available on request for operational use.

Operations

I was mostly tasked and involved in target reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

Taxi industry hit squad (Project Zola Budd)

I profiled people alleged to be taxi hit men and I was reporting to the project manager. I was provided with a list of targets suspected of taxi violence.

Project Border Posts

I was tasked with conducting research at border posts to recruit people (SARS or other law enforcement officials) working there. And to identify perfect positions to install cameras at border posts.

Illegal drugs (Project Puff, Project Heartbreak)

The task was to identify top druglords and research documents on illegal drugs. The targets were only profiled.

Exchange of suspected illegal drugs and abalone transactions occurred in Germiston-Wadeville, Alberton and at The Glen mall. Surveillance was conducted at business premises in Wadeville, and vehicles leaving premises were followed to Alberton and The Glen mall.

The following day, the team conducted surveillance in Mayfair and located abalone in Vereeniging.

Abalone

The team conducted surveillance in Cape Town and neighbouring towns, and on several premises or plots in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal.

Surveillance was conducted in Ladybrand, Free State, overnight.

Exchange of abalone in Port Elizabeth - team conducted surveillance in the suburb of Colleen Glen.

419 scam

The team conducted surveillance on a Nigerian national alleged of 419 scams in Kempton Park.

Ops Mint

The team drove to Newcastle, KwaZulu-Natal, to conduct surveillance in relation to allegations of a syndicate that manufactures fake South African monetary notes. The team was looking for machines and a factory that conducts such activities.

Training attended by member

Surveillance, firearms and CCTV.

Team Activities

Braai in Rietvlei Nature Reserve. Braai at Fountains.

AGENT 3

Midway through 2007, members were recruited - hand-picked - from SARS and other external law enforcement agencies. Notable here are the DSO [Directorate of Special Operations], South African National Defence Force and SAPS.

Successful candidates were notified, and told to expect to be incorporated into a unit called Special Projects Unit to be headed by "Skollie".

SPU Members

All members were informed that they should register new e-mail accounts and have private e-mails for communication purposes.

Skollie also instructed members to purchase new vehicles and acquire new, safe and secure residences as they would be well compensated and all would be getting car allowances. SPU members were also told by Skollie to register legitimate businesses which would serve as "cover" due to the fact that SPU members would be operating from their homes and would therefore attract attention.

Allocation of fake ID cards to SPU members

The members of SPU were instructed to create aliases or "cover" names to be used during operations.

All the members were issued with a high-quality ID card bearing the "cover" names and details. I still have the ID card that was issued to me.

These cards were later re-called and members were instructed to destroy them.

Skollie's departure and the birth of the National Research Group

At some time, the team was called to an urgent meeting and informed that Skollie was no longer in charge. Some time in 2008, the team was informed that Johann van Loggerenberg would take over. When JVL came to the team, changes were made immediately.

Minutes were kept of every meeting.

JVL engaged with team members regularly and demanded compliance and adherence to matters of discipline and governance.

The team was instructed by JVL to start submitting weekly reports on everything of the unit.

Mike Peega

Mike introduced me to several high-ranking members of the ruling party. He always insisted that all the engagements were "above board".

We once travelled to Polokwane and Joburg with Julius Malema, Fikile Mbalula and Pule Mabe. I was introduced to them by Mike. All this interaction was always reported to the unit's management.

We were providing a service of close protection - bodyguards and drivers.

Once, at the Kyalami racetrack, another agent informed me that he was there working on his bodyguard business. He showed me his Audi with branding on the sides [with the name] of his company.

Tokyo Sexwale, Paul Mashatile, Julius Malema, Fikile Mbalula, Pule Mabe, Fana Hlongwane, Mabheleni Ntuli and Zizi Kodwa were among other dignitaries.

There were incidents where NRG team members "accidentally" met ruling party members at hotels or airports.

Mike Peega was acquitted of all poaching charges brought against him in the Nelspruit Court.

AGENT 4

I joined the South African Revenue Service and more specifically the Special Projects Unit (SPU) on March 15 2007.

From the outset the SPU members operated from their respective houses.

As the members could not function in a conventional way, it was decided to issue the members with SARS appointment cards in false names.

If my memory serves me correctly, these cards were only valid for one month and were to be utilised for a specific project. Although the cards were produced they were not issued due to the legalities of issuing the cards to members.

The cards were withdrawn and destroyed. I have no knowledge of any member ever using such a card.

Because of security concerns files were encrypted.

Then, in December 2013, a break-in occurred at an agent's house. The circumstances of the break-in were suspicious and until today it remains unsolved. The financial loss to the member was in the region of R200000. Although the member was insured, the data lost as a result of the burglary was a blow to the unit.

Projects include:

April 2007: Team tasked to monitor 400kg of abalone from Cape Town;

July 2007: Team was tasked to trace 290kg of Anthranilic acid that was imported into the country. The acid was traced and located when it was moved from a warehouse in Germiston to the West Rand. Through investigations another premises was raided where 17000 Mandrax tablets worth approximately R500000 and presses for a Mandrax manufacturing machine were confiscated;

February 2011: The team was tasked in identifying the true identity of one Russel Knight. Knight was identified as a pseudonym for Radovan Krejcir. This led to a full investigation in identifying Krejcir's associates and companies. After a few months a comprehensive diagram with entities linked to Krejcir was forwarded. Routine monitoring led to the identifying of more people connected to Krejcir. Another individual, who was identified as being "approachable", was a former employee of Krejcir. Through this identification, SARS was able to obtain a written statement, which resulted in SARS obtaining a judgement against Krejcir. This operation is temporarily halted as Krejcir is on trial for various criminal charges;

May 2011: As a result of the investigation into Krejcir, several businesses were identified. One such address was in Sandton. SARS investigators visited the premises for routine investigations. The team provided backup to the team to prevent any intimidation or threat. The SARS team did not know about the team's presence. Were any threat detected, the team would have been warned through [the unit head's] intervention; and

June 2014: Transcribing of a meeting between role-players in the cigarette industry. People involved were Glenn Agliotti, Yusuf Kajee and Paul de Robillard.